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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ST Al~~ OF UT AHr
Plaintiff and
Respondent~

-vs-

Case No. 9089

MACK MERRILL RIVENBURGH, JR.,
and LEONARD WARNER BO\VNE,
Deferulants and

Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPOKDEKT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with many of the facts set out in
Appellant Bowne's brief, but deems it necessary to take
exception to certain parts thereof, and to add other pertinent facts necessary to a clear understanding of the
case.
Rivenburgh told Bo\vne be planned to kill Verner
by cutting off his head (or that Verner should have his
head cut off}. T. 220-223, 574~576t 790-691~ 815-818, 832t
865. Bowne joined in the planning. Several methods of
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killing Verner were discussed, including shooting him in
the arm with oil. T. 246. Randel tried to talk Bowne out
of having any connection with the murder~ T+ 247. The
pretense of sodomy was only a trick used to get Verner
to the attic . T. 815.. The defendants went separately to
the attic and together killed Verner-Bovrne holding Verner in a headlock or a scissor hold during the stabbing
by Rivenburgh. T.350t364t 372~ 379t380t709~ 807.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

(Rivenburgh)

THE VERDIC"f
EVIDENCE.

CONFORMS

TO

THE

POINT II

(Rivenburgh)
THERE IS NO PROOF THAT rfHE JURY
IN ITS DELIBERATION \VENT OUTSIDE THE
EVIDENCE AND TOOK INTO CONSIDERATJOX
THE OPENING STATEI\iENT OF COUNSEL~
FOR APPELLANT BOWNE. EVIDENCE WAS
ADDUCED TO SUPPORT SAID STATEIVlENT.
IF ERROR \VAS CO:\IlvTITTED~ lT WJ\S NOT
PREJUDICIAL ERROR li\ LIGHT OF ALL THE
CIRCUMST AI\ CES.

POINT III
(Rivenburgh)

THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION A~SKED
DR. CLARK V·lAS EN'T lREL"'\r PROPER AND
ITS ADMISSIO~ DID NOT COJ\STITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR.
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POINT IV
(Bowne)
APPELLANT BOWNE WAS NOT DENIED
DUE PROCESS l~I\TD~R THE FEDERAL OR
STATE CONSTITUTIOK; HF: WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR A)JD I~VIPARTIAL JURY; HE
WAS NOT DEl\TIED EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LA \VS; NOR DOES SECTION 77-30-2t
UTAH CODE Al\"N01~ATED 1953~ VIOLATE
EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE- CONSTITUTION.

POINT V
(Bowne)
THE TRI.AL COURT DID ~OT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REFUSING BOWNE~S MOTION FOR A SEPARATE TRIAL.
POINT VI
(Bowne)
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN KOT
GRANTING BOWNE'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
POINT VII
(Bowne)
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IK
GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15.
POINT VIII
(Bovvne)

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
IXSTRUC'TION 1\0. 26.

crv·r~G
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POINT IX
(Bo-wne}

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO Gl\1 E
NO. 13+

BO\\il\E~S

TKSTRUCTION

POIKT X
(Bowne)
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRA?\J"T A NEW TRIALr

POINT XI
(Bowne)
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION TO
FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS AND COPIES
OF STATE:\·fE~rrs MADE BY WITNESSES AND
DEFENDANTS.
POINT XII
(Bovme)

THE TRIAL COU·RT DID NOT ERR I~ REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE CHA.RACTER A.ND REPUTATION OF THE
DECEASED.

ARGUMENT
POII\!T I

(Rivenburgh)
THE

VERDIC'T

CONFORidS

TO

THE>

EVIDE~CE.

The general rule in this state is expressed in State
v~ Priestley, 97 U. 158, 91 P., 2d 447, to the effect that
jurors cannot impeach their verdict except in instances
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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expressly made exceptions by legislative enactment. In
Section 77-38-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953~ seven grounds
for a new trial are given, one of them being:
6) When the verdict or decision is contrary to law or evidence.~~
ll (

This subsection is relied upon by Appellant Rivenburgh
at Point I of hls briefr
Respondent believes that the affidavits submitted by
Rivenburgh are of no consequence and in fact cannot be
used to buttress his argument that the verdict "ras contrary to the evidence. This is for the court alone to detennine and lay jurors can add nothlng whatsoever by
affidavit or otherwise to a proper consideration of this
problem.
As a matter of factt it appears clear that the only subsections of Section 77-38-3 as to which jurors' affidavits
or testimony could be of any use are (2L (3) and (4), relating to evidence received out of court; to situations \~·here
the jury has separated without leave of the court after
retiring for deliberation~ or where misconduct has occurred;
and to situations where the verdict has been determined
by lot or means other than a fair expression of opinion by
all jurors. Any statements or evidence prepared or given
by jurors :J s to the other four subsections of the statute
would be completely immaterial.
Rivenburgh"s defense rests on his n1ental condition
after having swallowed what he alleges were a great many
amphetamine pills, commercially knoWl'l as Drinalfas. The
jury did not choose to adopt this theory and apparently
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concluded that Rivenburgh was able to form the intent
necessary to commission of first degree murder~

The jurors must have believed either that Rivenburgh did not take the dosage claimed, or that Dr+ Clark's
testimony proved that what he did take was not enough
to prevent his :forming the intent necessary to commit the
act. Disregarding for the present any belief the jury may
have had as to the number of pills consumed by Rivenburgh immediately prior to the killing~ respondent will
turn to a consideration of what was in evidence as to the
effect of the drug.
At page 4 of his brieft Rivenburgh quotes from Dr.

Clark's testimony, skipping here and there and taking only
short fragments~ It would seem advisable~ therefore, at
this point, to set forth additional excerpts from the tran~
script for the use of the court. Rivenburgh quotesr at page
4 of his brief~ the statement of the doctor that he had had
no experience with a certain dosage of amphetamine over
a seven-hour period~ Since Dr. Clark vvas an expert witness, he v.~as not limited to his own observations~ but could
testify on \Vhat he had learned by study Webb v~ Olin
lJfathieson Chern. Co., 9 U~ 2d7 27:3, 342 P. 2d 1094t and
through conferences with other doctors~ At page 463 of
the transcript, Dr. Clark states as follows:

·;on

the <)ther hand, the stimulant drugs:t a
stimulant can do so much, so to speak, and the addition of even a major increase in the dose \vill
commonly not produce all of that additional effect.
ul had a talk with Dr. Winkler a year ago, in

which we talked about some of his workj with
amphetamine and he pointed out that by slowly
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raising the dose. one could get up to 1400 milligrams a day, without seriously disorganizing the
individual~

''We were discussing the question of tolerance
development, and effects, and that actually it was
quite possiblej if one had the courage~ that you
could take t-you for instance and give you 1400
milligrams right now~'Q.

I

don~t

have that much courage.

It might not produce delirium~ It might
kill you~ or might produce only the same effect as
a fairly modest dose, but no one has dared to do
such an experiment.'~
~~A~

Dr. Clark's testimony continues at line 22, Tr 445:
'~Q.

Now is his behavior more important to
you in arriving at that conclusion. than knowing
the amount of Drinalfa he had taken during this
period?
1

'-L\. The behavior is all tha.t \-ve have to judge

by, and it would be more important than knowing

dose, in that there is evidence~ for ex~
that even a very massive amount could
have been taken~ and no delirium occur, which we
cited instances on.''
the

preci~e

ample~

Important answers are given regarding large dosages
at T. 433:
l~Q.

hi stories~

Do you know of any instances or case
where· large doses of this has been used?

Yes. There arc cases reported of the
gestation of 250 milligrams a day for long periods
of time. One -case is 700 milligrams a day for several
months, one of 250 per day for G yearsr The com~'.._!\_.
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mon dose use by addicts is about 200 or 250 milligrams a dE-y.
''Q. So that on this 700 per day, it would be
approximately-! believe you said 700 milligrams
per day; is that correct?
~"Ar Yes~

this is citing amphetamine, which is a
closer related drug.

'"Q+

Th~t

would be 350 of these pills per day:

is that correct?
If my arithmetic is right, 5 grams into
700----5 milligrams into 700 would be 140.
'"A~

~ 'Qr That is 140 of these tablets in a day; is
that correct?

Can you tell us what effects were observed on these particular case histories?
'·Q.

"~A~
These cases were cited to illustrate the
remarkable tolerance of these drugs which can develop. I am not familiar with the actual behavior
of these individuals during this time. But they are
not incompatible with their functioning re-dsonably
'veil in terms of work~ etc.
''I have personal experience of addicts who
have taken this amount of drugs and functioned
relatively 1..vell.

it is cited that at the end of this
prolonged ad diction, there did occur} a toxic rea ction to the drug whereby their behavior became
~tHo\vever,

disturbed~

In these three cases you cited, how long
a period did they take them?
~~Q~

'"A.. One case cited 250 milligrams a day for
five years, the other 700 milligrams a day for
several monthE~~'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At page 5 of his brief. Rivenburgh quotes a statement of Dr. Clark (T+ 442) to the effect that, HYes, I \vould
say that amphetamine does alter mental state, changes
self-awareness~'' etc. HoweverJ at T. 475, the following
colloquy occurs~ with the questions being asked by Mr .
Banks:
Doctor=- would a person~s behavior change
to a point~ v.."hile· he is under the influence of Drinalfa~would it change to a point he would do something, under that influence, \Vhich he \vould not do
under circumstances when he had not taken the

,:'Q.

Drinalia?

No:r I would not expect it.H

"'A.
At T .

442~

the following question8 and answers occur:
\vi th reference to the mental

~ 'N O\.v

processes~

as to destroying men tal processes~ lNould there also
have to be toxic delirium present?
~~A+

to met

I do not like the 'vortl ~destroy', because
implies a total obliteration of functions.

thi~

~~Q.

Let us use the \Vord

'impair'~

doctor+

~'.l\__

Yes. I would say that amphetamine does
alter mentul state~ changes self-awareness~ gives us
an increased feeling of alertness, etc. but so far as
producing a di~turbance that "\vould disrupt the
\Vholc pattern of the individual's behavior) this
would not occur, unless there wa.s occurrence of
delirium.~,

Furthermore~

at T. 470~ Dr. Clark states as follows:

~'A.

1\. . o, sir, I cannot agree "\Vith this ~t.ep

wise thing you describe. The experimental ""',.ork I
have done 'vith these drugst where one was testing
a specific thing of controlling \V hat one \Vas saying,
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I found that all of the drugs I studied, up to the
point that the individual became unconscious, he
was able to perform extremely well in the express
measures I was using~ which involved ego control
or the control of what one said or did not say, and
I could cite these details if you V\' ish.'~

In answer to a hypothetical question, utilizing the facts
of the case introduced in evidence but not assuming any
specific amount of amphetamine taken by Rivenburgh) Dr.
Clark testified at T ~ 444, that doing such acts as were indicated by the question would not mean that the amphetamine he had taken had impaired his mind to the point of
destroying his ability to determine the difference between
right and wrong.

On redirect examination!f Dr~ Clark at T+ 475 states
that even though a person does perform a spur-of-the~
moment actionr it does not mean that he does not know
what he is doing+ At T~ 438, Dr. Clark says that short of
toxic deliri urn the brain process is not disturbed by the
use of the pills nor is it impaired. He further states that
amnesia does not derive from use of the drug nor does the .
drug have any particular effect either to stimulate or supPress sexual desires.
Rivenburgh's own testimony as to the events \vhich
occurred prior to, at the time ofJ and after the killing is
cleart comprehensive, and precise as to details. This alone
should completely ans,Ner the allegation that he was not in
control of his faculties. Rivenburgh knew on the day of
the murder and knew at the time of the trial exactly what
was happening at the crucial times~ His acts were pren1 editated and were not the result of taking the pills~
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Thi~
script~

is shown by the following excerpt from the tranbeginning at line 17, on page 634:
(By Mr. Banks.)

Q.

But it was the pills causing your action
Sunday?

A.

Pardon me, sir?

Q.

That it was the pills causing your action on
Sunday?

A.

I just got mad~ sir~

Q.

You knew what you "r.rere doing Sunday, except
when you got mad?

A.

I believe I did, yes; at least I think.??

Furthermore~

Rivenburgh had been on the pills, according to his own testimony (his brief, page 12) ever
since June. t"fhus, he had managed to build up a great tolerance for them and the 55 to 60 pills he claims he took~
if in fact he did take them (T. 520);t could have had nou.--here near the effect on him as upon one not accustomed
to regular use.
Here there was overwhelming evidence that Rivenburgh was not so affected a~ to be unable to form the
necessary intent.

Nor, can Rivenburgh, not having introduced expert evi...
dence at the trial to combat Dr. Clark"'s statements, now
present to the court for the first time on appeal exc-erpts
from medical texts as he has presumed to do in his brief
at pages 14 through 17.
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POI~T

II

(Rivenburgh)

THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE JURY
IN ITS DELIBEHATIO~ WENT OCTSIDE THE
EVIDENCE AND TOOK TKTO CONSIDERATIO~
THE OPENING STATEMENT OF COT~NSEL
FOR APPELLANT BOVVNE. EVIDENCE WAS
ADDUCED TO SUPPORT SAID STA'fEM.l£1\~·r.
IF ERROR WAS CO:t.·1MITTED, IT WAS NOT
PREJL'DICIAL ERROR IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
CIRCUSISTANCES.
Bowne attempted to show that he feared Rivenburgh
enough to do what Rivenburgh demanded of him. While
he did not testify in full detail as to Mr~ Hansents com~
ments at page 18 of Rivenburgh . s brief, Bowne did testify that he performed all the acts asked of him or demanded of him by Rivenburgh relating to such things as standing point, coming to assist him and attempting to find his
knifet and in establishing an alibi to help him. Such references are numerous and appear among other places at
T. 582, 590, 693, 694, 699, 710~ 721, 726~ 733t 735~ 792, 834,
839 and 843.

Hansen's comments were not evidence and were
not so regarded by the jury.
~Ir.

Rivenburgh could not possibly have been hurt by any
failure on the part of Bowne to produce evidence concerning matters in Mr. Hansen's opening statement+ Quite
to the contrary~ any omissions definitely 1.vere in his favor. Additional evidence of compulsion on the part of
Rivenburgh and fear on the part of Bowne would only
have increased the jury's belief as to Rivenburgh~s guilt .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

Furthermore, Rivenburgh's counsel did not object to
Mr. Hansents statement nor request an instruction for the
purpose of curing the supposed error. It is, of course:t not
error for the court not to give an instruction where it is
not asked. State v. Peterson~ 121 U. 229, 240 P+2d 504. So
much of a derogatory nature was adduced as to Rivenburgh that any affect Mr . Hansen's statement might have
had would have been insignificant. Therefore, if error did
occur :t it did not constitute reversible error.

POINT III
(Rivenburgh)
THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION ASKED
DR. CLARK \Vl\S E.r\TlRELY PROPER AKD
ITS AD:\liSSIOK DID 2'JOT CONSTITT_~TE REVERSIBLE ERROR.

Appellant Rivenburgh makes many objections in his
Point IV to the hypothetical question presented to T ~ 444
and 445~ but does not go into any of them in detail:r nor
does he present law supporting themr
The fairness of a hypothetical question is largely a
matter resting in the discretion of the tria 1 court \vhose
ruling thereon vlill not be grounds for reversal in the
absence of a shovnng of abuse· of such discretion. Martinez
v+ People, (Colo.), 235 P.2d 810.
j

Respondent believes Rivenburgh's argument can be
answered fuJly by pointing out that the district attorney
asked t\\.'O hypothetical questions;. each eliciting a separate
answer from Dr~ Clark. To the first question and answer,
beginning at T~ 444, Rivenburghts counsel did not object
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and therefore waived any objection he might have hadr
Even if the court, despite Dr. Clark's answer at line 23 of
T. 444, should regard the hYJJothetical questions _as a single
question, however, the objections of Rivenburgh are not
\vell taken. The only ground there relied on is that no
mention was made of the amount of amphetamine

consumed.
The contention of counsel for Rivenburgh that the
hypothetical question was based on facts not in evidence
is not true. With possibly one minor exception, all were
clearly in evidence before the question was asked~ The
following references are only a few of many showing this
in the transcripL

As to securing a knife or
and 423.

knives~

see T. 225, 307, 344

..

As to a disguise (for example:P using someone
clothes)t see T~ 224 and 357.
As to change of

clothing~

else~s

see T. 224 346 and 357.
1

to preparations for and the actual attempt to sever
the head of the victim, see T~ 221~ 350 and 360.
A~

As to the death of the victim, see T. 146 and 366.
As to the destruction of

clothing~

see T. 240j 368 and

390.

As to the creation of an alibi:r see T.

257~

343 and 393.

Respondent has not found testimony introduced prior
to the asking of the question relating specifically to the
cleaning of Rivenburgh~s shoes; but againj no objection
to the question \vas:i made on this or any other ground and~
the refore~ it is waived.
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The other contentions of Rivenburgh~s Point IV are
Vli.thout merit and have been answered heretofore in thi...;;

briet
POINT IV
(Bowna)
API>ELLANT BOWN ~ WAS NOT DE:.: TED
DUE PROCESS TT~DER TJI:C FEDERAL OR
ST 1\ TE CONSTITUTION; HE \VAS NOT DEN IED A FAIR AI\TD IMPARTI . ~L
.
Jl.TR\'; HE
,~lAS NOT DEI\IED EQUAL PROTECT! OX OF
THE LA \VS; KOR DOES SEC~"fiOJ\ 77 -30-2~

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, VIOLA..TE
EITHER THE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTI~
TU!fiON.
Appellant Bowne does not present a strenuous argument for either his due process of law or fair and impartial
jury theories but does seem to lay great stress upon the
matter of equal protection of the laws~
As to the question of denial of due process of la\v
under the Utah Constitution~ this court has held in
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 U~ 1~ 163 P.2d 314 that the
essentials of due process are:
1

* * {a)

the existence of a competent person.
body~ or agency authorized by la\v to determine the
questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the
question by such person, body, or agency; (e) notice to the per~on of the inauguration and purpose
of the inquiry and the time at \Vhich such person
should appear if he wishes to be heard; {d} right to
appear in person or by eounsel; (e} fair opportunity
to submit evidence~ examine and cross-examine
witnesses: (f) judgment to be rendered upon the
'"*
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record thus made. In the absence of statute laying
down other or more specific requirements:P the
above conditions meet the demands of due process.* * *~~
1n the same case the court said that while many attempts

had been made to further define due process of law, all
of them revolve around the idea that a party shall have
his day in court4
The case of Untermyer~ et al~~ v~ State Tax Comm.~ et
atj 102 U. 214 1 129 P.2d 881, held that since our due process
clause is substantially the same as those in the Fifth and
1\-ourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, U~ S. Supreme Court decisions are to be
considered highly persuasive by this court.
With reference to the Federal Amendments, it has always been held that due process of law is not to be turned
into a destructive dogma against the states in the administration of their system of criminal justice; and the procedure followed by the states shall not be held to violate
the requirements of due process unless it violates the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty and unless to
continue it would vio1ate a principle of just ice so rooted
iri the traditions and conscience of the people as to be
ranked as fundamental. 16A C.J.S. 579, at page 623.

The prosecution of crime is a matter for the individual states except for the limited scope of the federal
criminal code; and the due process clause does not require
that criminal procedure be uniform throughout the states,
but each state can choose the methods and practices by
which crime is brought to book as long as the ultimate
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dignities of man assured by the· Federal Constitution are
observed. Carter v~ People of State of Illinois, 67 S.Ct.
216, 329 U. S. 173.
A~ f~r

as the Federal Constitution is concerned, due
process of law does not in and of it~elf require jury trial
at all in a criminal case; and the Federal Constitution
does not prohibit the states from regulating and restricting the right of trial by jury in their own courts) as they
may deem proper~ or in the manner in which states may
select jurors, as long as the method employed does not
exclude persons from jury service because of race~ color
or previous servitude or does not violate ~orne principle
of fairness deeply rooted in the courfs legal consciousness.
16A C.J.S. 590, at page 655. Nor has any federal or state
constitutional provision come to respondent's attention
which by its terms or necessary implication would grant
the defendant any peremptory challeng€~ at all.

Rivenburgh and Bowne were tried in accordance with
due process and the requirements of out statutes were
fully met in every instance.
Clear Jy.. in construing a statute, all doubts should be
resolved in favor of constitutionality, General Electric v.
Thrifty Sales ;o 5 U ~2d 326 ~ 301 P.2d 741.
rrhat Bowne had a fair and impartial jury is shown
by the scru.pulou~ care taken by Judge Jeppson in impaneling itr Hi:.-:; questioning~ aided by defense counsel, was
exhaustive, covering the first 66 pages of the transcript.
A reading thereof should Stitisfy the court that the jury
could not have been anything other than fair and impartial.
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Bowne lays great stress on what he claims amounts
to unequal protection of the lawsr In this regard~ Bowne
provides us, at page 9 of his brief, with a quotation from
the case of People v. O'Laughlin, 3 U~ 153, 1 P. 653r The
courtt after quoting the substance of the defendant's case t
demolishes his argument in the next sentence with this
statement:
u+ • *This reasoning, although plausible and in-

genioust is not

good~

* * *'~

There a defendant had a right to three peremptory chalJenges and the court pointed out the absurdity of 13 defendants receiving 39 peremptory challenges.

That BolNlle's assertion is not the law in Utah is
clearly shown by the court's holding is the case of State
v. l'l emier, 106 U ~ 307, 148 P .2d 327. There three defendants were tried for assault with a deadly weapon4 The
eourt held that they were entitled to ten peremptory challenges but that they must be exercised collectively and
that each defendant was entitled to two additional challenges \Vhich he could exercise separately. The court said:
''* * *Where there are two or more defendants~
ihe :~ta tu te does not provide for additional separate
challenges if defendants refuse to join in the collective challenges.''

The court said that each
number of challenges.

''side'~

should have an equal

While the Utah court did not -concern itself with the
con st.i tutionality of the act this aspect of the problem has
been considered by courts in other juris(lictions.
J
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In the case of Muller v. Hale (Calit), 71 P. 81~ the
court upheld the constitutionality of a statute which
stated:
~'Either

party may challenge the jurors; but where
there are several parties on either side~ they must
join in a challenge before it can be made.u
The court stated:
~urhe

appellant concedes that the ruling of the
court was justified by t.he statute of this state, but
contends that it violates the ft.,ourteenth A-mendment of the Constitution of the TJnited States in
that it denies persons equal protection of the laws.
"\Ve see nothing in this contention~* * ~ ."
It is true that this was a civil case~ but where the matter
of equal protection of the laws is involved, there is no
essential difference between civil and criminal rights.
For example, in People v. Pitbol (Calif. L 260 P. 303j a
criminal case the court ex pres sly relied on the holding
in the ~luller case and held that:
1

''The requirement that defendants or parties must
join in the exercise of peremptor~y challenges is
not violative of any constitutional provision.''
The court also quotes from lfi Calif. Juris. 407, Sec. 79, to
this effect:
~~In criminal cases when several defendants
are tried together, they cannot sever their challenges but must join therein. And in civil actions
where there are several parties on either sidet they

mu~t

join in the challenge before it can be made.
In construing these provisions, it has been held in
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criminal cases that defendants must join in peremptory challenges as well as in those for cause~ The
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not
deny persons the equal protection of the laws, and
thus violate the Fourteenth Amendment, for the
same rule applies to all the parties to an action
'vhere they are united with others either as plaintiffs or defendants/'
In the case of Leback, et al v~ Nelson:~ (Idaho)~ 107
P .2d 10 54~ the court, in dealing with a statute similar to
that cited in the Muller case~ failed to find it offensive to
the constitution. It is not an unreasonable classification
to require defendants tried together to join in their peremptory challenges or take a lesser number thereof.
It is interesting to note too that Mr. Hansen did not
demand a formal ruling from the court on the matter of
the challenges at the trialr

POINT V
(Bowne)

THE TRIAL COURT DID 1\'0T ABUSE ITS DISCRETIO='f IN REFUSING BO\-V2'JE~S ~-lOTION
FOR . -\
. SEP . ~RATE
.
TRIAL+
Section 77-31-6 ~ U. C.A. 1953, reads as follo-w-s:
~'\Vhen two or more defendants are jointly
charged \Vith any offense~ whether felony or misdemeanor~ they shall be tried jointly, unless the
court in it~ discretion on the motion of the prosecutin g attorney or any defend ant orders separate
trials+ In D rd ering separate trialst the court may
order that one or more defendant.~ be each separately tried and the others jointly triedt or may
order that several defendants be jointly tried in
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one trial and the others jointly tried in another
trial or trials~ or may order that each defendant be
separately tried. J'
Judge Jeppson carefully considered the representations made to him at the time the motion for separate trials
was made. He was~ of course, clothed \Vith wide discretion
under the circumstances; and while it is true that a judge
may not exercise his discretion in an arbitrary wayf a careful examination of the transcript clearly indicates that the
judge did not do so.

In the case of State v+ Miller, 111 U~ 255~ 177 P~2d 727~
the court held that since an accused cannot demand severence as a matter of right, it must have appeared that the
trial court had before it facts indicating the accused would
be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial before the Supreme
Court could hold it had abused its discretion.
Contrary to the claim of Bowne, the defenses which
he and Rivenburgh put forth, while somewhat different,
to be sureJ were not antagonistic. There were no such
circumstances as were reported in the case. of People v.
Braune, (IlL), 2 N~E~2d 839, so strongly relied upon by
Bovme at page 18 of his brief. There the court stated that
in the petitions seeking separate trials., each defendant:
~, * * * declared the other \vould take the 'v it ness
stand and testify to a state of facts which would
be exculpatory of the witness and condenmatory
of his codefendant.n

This is not true in the instant situation nor in fact
did Bowne so allege in his motion for a new triaL Rivenburgh at no time, as far as respondent can ascertain, ac-
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cused Bo1V11e of perpetrating the act nor did Bowne himself
at any time attempt to urge that he· was not present at
the scene.
Even~

however, if each party had alleged that the
other perpetrated the crime, the court still would have
been on solid ground in refusing separate trials under the
holding in Lucas v. U. S. {D.C.), 104 Fed+2d 225! wherein
the court said:
7

~'*

* *If the government had been compelled

to try
each separately, Johnson would have placed the
blame on Lucas and Lucas on Johnson, and the
probable result would have been an acquittal of
both. In these circumstances it was "'Tithin the
sound judicial disc ret ion of the trial court whether
to grant separate trials~
In examining the evidence certified~ we find nothing which shows that
either accused sustained any prejudice by the
course adopted.Jt
+

•

•

During the course of the trial both parties admitted
their presence at the scene of the crime even though advised by separate attorneys at all times+ The evidence of
both defendants \vas consistent in every substantial way
under direct examination, each claiming the reason for
bJ'Oing to the attic was the commission of an act of sodomy
by Rivenburgh.
It is true that the defenses were somewhat different~
Bowne~s turning on his denial of any implication in the
act of killing and Rivenburgh's being based essentially on
his taking of drugs, making it impossible for him to control his actions or to create the intent to commit murder.
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tagonistic to each other. The jury at all times was aware
of the claims of the parties and undoubtedly treated them
separately~ applying evidence as indicated, to a particular
individual and not to both indiscriminately~
l

Furthermoret a conspiracy was proven and
acts of one apply to the other.

thus~

the

Bowne strongly urges that an abuse of discretion occurred in the court's not proving separate trials for
another reason, that isr alleged statements made by Rivenburgh~s attorney to the effect that the defense set forth by
Rivenburgh '~was the only defense in [the] case and if
[they] didntt go along \Vith him in that defense, he would
make first degree murderers of Jesse )1. Garcia, Jr. and
Leonard Warner Bowne."~
This~

of course, cannot sensibly be construed as a
genuine threaL Mr. Huntsman is a reputable member of
the bar and~ of course~ would not make this statement in
any other way than to show the importance and urge the
adoption of his point of viewr It was merely the innocent
use of colorful language~ To ascribe to this remark the
nature of a genuine threat is totally absurd and at the
very best a frivolous contention.

Respondent cannot understand how the evidence as
to the use of amphetamine drugs~ all of which related to
Rivenburgh, could in any way have prejudiced Bowne.
Furthermore, the evidence was adduced in his own defense
by Rivenburgh and if it were thought by the jury to
apply also to Bo~'Tiet it would have constituted a matter of
defense for him too.
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page 21 of his brief, Bowne points to certain testimony applicable to Rivenburgh and inferentially suggests
that it might have been applied improperly to BoVllle and
be prejudical to him. Counsel for respondent has checked
this evidence and has found that it did not relate even
by implication to Bowne+ As to Rivenburgh's conversation
-with decedent (Tr 498)t Rivenburgh admitted that Bowne
was outside the cell where the conversation took place
and seven or eight feet away~ nor was Bowne mentioned
in the conversation set out at T. 511. As to Rivenburghts
conversation with Dalton (T~ 513), Bowne was not mentioned~ Rivenburgh~s conversation with Dripps (T. 333)J
related to standing point, something \vhich Bowne never
denied doing. As to Rivenburgh's statement to Stark about
a dead man in the attic {T~ 366), the court specifically
admonished the jury that this statement was not to be
considered as to Bowne at all. Nor is prejudice toward
Bowne evident in any of the other statements. cited in his
brief.
,.~t

Bowne points to the holding in State v~ Miller, suprat
to the effect that the matter of separate trials should be
decided upon any abuse which may have arisen at the
time of the ruling and not on prejudicial error~ See People
v. Friday~ {Calif.)t 63 P.2d 303. This would rule out~ of
course~ the holding in People v. Fisher, (N.Y.), 164 N .E.
336 (Bownets Brief, page 22) and would make it unneces~
sary for the court to consider the specific points of evidence
raised now on appeal.
7

In the Friday case, which revolved around a similar
statute to our Section 77-31..:6, U~C.A . 1953~ the court said:
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'~***Order for separate trial must be based upon
some legal ground which satisfies the trial court
that the regular procedure must be departed from."

Bowne urges that any supposed antagonism between
the defendants could not be overcome by proper admonitions or instructions to the jury,. made for the purpose of
protecting the interest of each.. However, in the case of
U.S. vr Gilbert, 31 Feel. Supp. 195, the court approved the
trying of fifty~three defendants together in a mail fraud
case and said:
rights of each defendant can be carefully guarded by the trial judge in a charge to the
jucy/'
~~***The

While~

as Bo\vne states (his brief, page 24), the
question whether or not the trial judge has abused his
discretion in refusing to grant a scpara te trial is a problem
peculiar to each easel we do have enough holdings of
neighboring state courts to give adequate guidance here.
In the case of State v. Clark, (Wash+), 286 P~ 69,. prior
to the beginning of the trial the appellant moved the court
for a separate trial on three grounds~ summarized as
follows~

(1) that

evidence

again~t

the two was different;

(2) that evidence might be admissable against one
but not against petitioner and that such evidence would
be pre judie al; and
(3) that the interests of defendants ~'are or may prove
to be antagonistic and adverse,'' that the parties could
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not join in the selection oi a jury and that petitioner would
be deprived of his proper challenges.
The trial court denied the motion and was sustained
on appeal. The Supreme Court pointed out that prior to
the enactment of the statute involved, a defendant could
demand a separate trial as a matter of right but that the
new law made this a discretionary matter with he court.
This circumstance is identical to that in Utah. The court
mentioned that this was a most radical change . It said
that it had passed earlier on the question of separate trials
'With the simple statement that ~~the question was one
within the discretion of the tria I cou rL''
Then the court made the following holding, which
applies directly to the instant situation:
''$

* • The question arose again

in Stllte

v~

Ditrnar,

132 Wash. 501~ 232 P. 321, and a similar ruling was
made, although we there intimated that the discretion exercised might be the subject of review
for manifest abuse. It is said~ howevert that the
present case is distinguished from the cited cases
in the fact that there is in the present case a showing of nee essity for a separate trial, while in the
cited cases there was not. But this fact cannot affeet the rule. \Vhile the showing may aid the court
in the exercise of its discretion, it neither adds to
nor Jimits its powers. The question is still one on
which the court may exercise its discretion, and, if
the manner of it~ exercise is reviewable at all~ it i.;;
only so for manife:-1t abuse.
''llut, conceding that the ruling may be refor the latter reason]" \Ve see nothing in the
showing here made which would even indicate
that a denial of a separate trial would amount to
~n abuse of discretion. It would be difficult to conviev~red
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ceive of a case where two or more persons are tried
for the same crime in which some one or more of
the conditions pointed out will not arise~ and, if
they are to be regarded as requiring a separate
trial, it is at once plain that the statute is rendered
nugatory and joint trials will be the exception
and not the rule. But such was not the intent of
the I_Jegislature. There were some real evils \Vhich
the Legislature sought to correct by the change in
the statute; the principle one, doubtle~S 7 being to
lessen the excessive costs to the public which separate trials entailed. BuC be the intention what it
may~ inasmuch as the Legislature has vested the
right in the discretion of the trial court, there must
be reasons more persuasive than those here shown
before the reviewing court would be warranted in
j

in t~rfering ~' ~

The California case of People v.
says:

Thomas~

27 P.2d 765,

'~We find

no error in the trial court-'s ruling
denying appellant's motion for a separate trial.
Since the amendment in 1921 of sec:tion 1098 of the
Penal Code (St. 1921l p. 90), defendants jointly
charged are not longer entitled to separate tria Is as
a matter of righL The granting or refusing of separate trials now rests largely, if not \Vholly~ within
the discretion of the trial court~ and it is well settled that the ruling of the trial court denying a motion for a separate· trial will not be disturbed in the
absence of a claim showing of an abuse of discretion.
People v. Dowell~ 204 Cal. 109r 266 P. 807; People
V~ P-erryj 1!15 CaL 623, 234 P. 890; People v~ Erno,
195 Cay. 272~ 232 P. 710; People v+ Roderick, 118
Cal.App. 457, 5 P~2d 463; People v~ Burdg, 95 Cal.
App. 259, 272 P. 816; People v. Nelson~ 90 Cal.App.
27, 265 P. 366: People v. Wilson~ 7G Cal.App. 688,
245 P. 781; People v. Swoape, 73 Cal.App. 404,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

242 P. 1067~ ~~ppellanfs motion was in \Vritten fonn
and specified four grounds: (l) That idatlock~s
confession would be introduced in evidence and
would be prejudicia 1 to appellant; (2) that on a
joint trial, appellant's right to exercise peremptory
challenges '\\'ould be limited; (3) that each of the
defendants had his own theory of defense and that
said theories were conflicting; and {4) that defendants had recently qu(lrreled over their conflicting
views on the conduct of the tria 1. Practically all of
these grounds were urged in support of the motions
for separaie tria Is made in the cases a hove cited,
but they were held insufficient to show ;1ny abu~e
of discretion in denying the motions~ We find no
abuse of discretion in the present case.''
Any ill \viii which may have existed between counsel
for the parties is not of importance since each attorney
had the opportunity fully to cross-examine statements
made by the other defendant. As a matter of fact~ each of
the attorneys cooperated carefully in helping bring out
evidence from the other~s client on cross examination~
The IVIiller case, supra, held that where a proper
motion 'vas timely made~ the failure to grant a severence
on the grounds of confession of a codefendant was not
prejudicial \vhere the court properly instructed the jury as
to the use of the confession.
Bo\vne~

rather than being hurt through being tried
vvith Rivenburgh~ \vas instead greatly helped. Bo"rne undoubtedly appeared to the jury less culpable than Rivenburgh \vhose callous disregard for humanity was so clearly
evident throughout the trial, especially in hit-; O'Wll testimony. The contrast bet\veen the parties could only have
resulted in benefit for Bowne and this, of course, was
shown in the jury's recommendation of :mercy for him.
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1n the absence of a showing that the trial court has
~dJused its discretion, the Supreme Court should not Interfere with its action in denying separate trials.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR L\l NOT
GRA0J'T"l~C BOvV~E'S MOTION TO DIS\IJISS.
(Bowne)
The trial judge made the only proper holding in denying Bowne's motion for dismissaL Thereafter, he wisely
gave Instruction No~ 8, quoted by Bowne in his brief}
properly ph-icing the responsibility for the determination
of the facts of the case where it belonged~ on the jury.
Then, as an added safeguard for Bo"WIJ.e, he gave Instruction No. 24:' as follows:
~"In

this caset the defendant Leonard Warner

Bowne has made a motion to dismiss on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence to support a
verdict against himt which motion was denied by
the court.

are instructed that said motion was denied as a matter -of la\v ~ and in no \vay reflect.'-; the
opinion of the Court relative to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, Leonard Warner Bowne~
You should not })e influenced either for or against
said defendant, Leonard ''Tarner no"vne) because
said motion \-va~ made or because it \Vas denied by
the Court. Y()U are to decide the case on the facts.'t
~~You

While it is true that the state has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is
guilty, respondent believes th.ut Bo1Nlle has tortured the
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law in claiming the judge was obligated to dismiss the
action as to him+
If the court were to adopt Bowne:rs theory that whenever the evidence indicates a ''reasonable hypothesis :rt of
innocence, the case should not be allowed to go to the
jury at all~ normal criminal practice would indeed be
stifled and perhaps eventually destroyed. Any defendant
could be expected to conjure up evidence of such nature
ag to constitute a prima facie "rea..~onable hypothesis'' of
innocence and the state~s case would automatically dissolve. This is not the la-\V in Utah and such a conclusion
would be absurd beyond belieL

It is true that if the state were to fail to pro due e evidence sufficient to make out the elements of the crimet the
court would~ of course~ be justified in dismissing the complaint. But that is not so here~
Our system of jurisprudence has from earliest times
required that a jury of a man's peers find the facts of
his case~ \Vith the law to be determined by the judge. It
i;s the sole and exclusive province of the jury to determine
the facts in all criminal cases~ whether the evidence offered by the state is weak or strongt is in conflict or is
not controverted. Evidence may be ever so convincing
that an accused is guilty of the crime cbarged~ yet it is
for the jury Bnd not for the trial judge to render the verdict. State v. Green, 78 Ur 580, 6 P.2d 177~
Where there is .adduced~ in a criminal prosecution~
competent evidence from \vhich a jury can find beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant perpetrated the crime
with which he is chargedt there can be no error in failing
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to direct a verdict of acquittaL State v. Peterson~ 121 "C.
229~ 240 P.2d 504~
As to the three questions· of motion to dismiss, motion
for directed verdict and motion for a new trial, the court
has recently spoken in the case of State v ~ Penderville~ 2
U.2d 281~ 272 P . 2d 195. The court said~
u* **It has been repeatedly held by this court

that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct .a verdict
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial
court does not consider the weight of the evidence
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the
naked legal propos it ion of IaVr~, \V heth er there is
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the accused,
and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in
favor of the state. * * * As is pointed out in one or
more of these cases, the trial court has a discretion
in the case of a motion for a new trial that it does
not have in case of a motion to dismiss or to direct
a verdict of not guilty. 1\"':evertheless, in either case
if there is before the court evidence upon which
reasonable men might differ as to whether the defendant is or is not guilty~ he may deny the motion .
Bowne uses the case of State v. Erwin, 101 U+365, 120
P .2d 285, to say that if the facts relied on by the state are·
not inconsistent with defendantts innocence~ it is esta~
l:ished as a matter of law. The court there affirmed the
decision against appellant and went on to say this:
~' * * * It is not necessary that each circumstance in
itself establish the guilt of the defendant, but the
whole chain of circumstances"' taken together,. must
produce the required proof. State v. Cra\vford, 59
Utah 39, 201 P. 10~0; State v~ 11arasco, 81 l.Itah
325, 17 P.2d 919; Terry v. United States]' 9 Cir~~ 7
F.2d 28; State v~ Burch, Utah, 115 P.2d 911.
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~~on

the other hand, if there is any substantial
evidence which satisfies the above requirements 7
then the weight of the evidnce is for the juryt and
the court will not disturb the verdi ct. State v.
Lewellyn, 71 Utah 331, 22·6 P. 261; State v. Odekirk~
56 Utah 272, 190 P+ 777 ."
The case of State

v~ Lewellyn~

71 U. 331, 266 P . 261,
was an adultery prosecution wherein defendant made a
motion for a directed verdict. The same reasoning would
.seem to apply to a motion to dismiss:P of course. The court
there stated the following:
'~In

16 C.J

r

935~

the conclusions of various

courts are condensed in the statement:
'' 'As a general rule the court should direct a
verdict of acquittal* * * where there is no competent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the
charge; or ¥lhere the evidence js undisputed and
so weak that a conviction would be attributable to
passion or prejudice, or where it is so slight and
indeterminate that a verdict of guilty would be set
aside, n~ where the evi de nee consists solely of the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice~ or is
insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocenee, or to ~hov{ defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But the case should be submitted to the
jury and the court should not direct a verdict of
acquittal, if there is any evidence to support or
reasonably tending to support the charge, as where
it js sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption of innocence, or where the evidence of a

rna terial nature is conflicting. t ~
~'From

Pace v. Commonwealtht 170 Ky. 560.
186 S.W. 142, \\'·e quote the syllabus on this point
as follows:
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~~~It

is only in the absence of any evidence tending to establish the guilt of the accused that the
trial court will be authorized to grant a peremptory
instruction directing his a cqui ttal.'
same principle is decided 1n State v.
Gross_. Ohio St. 161, 110 N.E. 466.
~~The

'An able discussion and determination of the
bounds of judicial authority in considering a motion for a directed verdict is contained in Isbell v.
U+S. 142 C.C.A+ 312~ 227 F~ 788~ in \vhich it is made
clear that the court in su-ch case does not consider
the weight of evidence· or credibility of witnesses
but determines the naked legal proposition of law
whether there is any substantial evidence of the
guilt of the accused4 This is undoubtedly the correct
rule+ See annotation ~n irecting Acquittal, 17 A .L .R.
910. The function of a court in dealing with an application for a directed verdict must not be confused with that in considering a motion for a new
trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of evidence~
The court has a discretion in the latter case which
he does not properly have in the former~ The reason
for the distinction is that the order sought in one
case acquits the accused and finally ends the prosecution, while in the othert the order~ if granted,
does not di.Echarge the accused but merely gives
hi.m the advantage and benefit of another trial.
The rule i~ controlled by the same principles in
criminal cases as in civil procedure. And in a civil
case, Starn v~ Ogden P~ & P~ Co.t 53 Utah 248t 177
P ~ 2.18, this court said:
1

t

'It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction
and perhaps in nearly every other where the jury
system prevails~ that~ if there is any substantial
evidence whatever upon which to base a verdict,
the court will not \vithdraw the case from the jury
or direct what their verdict should be+' :t,
H
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See also State v. Thatcher:' 108 Utah 63~ 157 P.
2 258; and State v. lversun -Utah - decided by
this court March 7 196 0.
1

1

Counsel has presented a number of references to the
transcript - each tending~ if unanswered~ to establish
Bowne S innocence. Perhaps standing alone1 they might
constitute a reasonable hypothesis. Howevert whether it
is reasonable must be determined by reference to the entire
body of testimony given by both sides in the case.
Because Bowne has set forth so many references to
1

the trnnscri pt~ tending to substantiate his claim~ the state
deems it necessary to refer to some, though by no means
all, of the evidence tending to prove Bowne's guilt beyond
any reasonable doubt. They will be set out in the chron~
ological order of the case. (References correlate with the
small typewritten number at the top, right-hand margin
of each page, rather than the larger stamped red number
at the bottom . )

T. 220-223: Billie Randel testifies to Rivenburgh's
statement that he intended to kill Verner by
cutting off his head and that Bowne was present
at the time. Randel did not remember whether
or not Bowne said anything at that time.
T.

232~

Randel on hearing a scream goes to Rivenburgh~s cell, indicating R:nowledge that Rivenburgh's remarks had in fact been serious.

T. 234: Randel goes to Bowne~s cell~ sees him try~
ing to stop the flow o£ blood from his leg and
ha.;.; a conversation in which Bowne says he wa~
stabbed .
T~

237: Randel tells of bloody knives being washed
in Bowne's cell.
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T . 241: Randel testifies about blood on
pants.
T~

Bowne~s

246: At the time of the conversation about the
impending murder, Randel testifies he ~ug
gested shooting olive oil into the arm of Verner
and BO\'-~ne 's reaction is sho\VIl by his statementt
according to Randel, that Bo\vne had previously
shot Verner in the arm.

T. 247: The fact that Bowne was serious about
Rivenburgh~s statement is shown by Randel's
testimony that he cautioned Bo-wne not to have
anything to do with the murder~
T. 287: Randel admits having made the following
statement at the preliminary hearing: ''Warner
said that he had walked over to this Verner and
that Verner had kicked hlm and knocked him
down, and that he grabbed his legs to keep him
from kicking him againt and somebody had
stabbed him in the leg.n

T.

325~

T~

339-343: Harold Dalton testifies that Bowne
came down from the attic covered with blood;
that he proceeded to clean up and to receive aid
for hiE leg.

T~

1;)0: Dalton n1akes an extremely damaging
statement as follows: '(Bowne said he had his
head [\.Ierner's 1 in a scissor~ lock, and his hand
in his mouth, and pretty har(! to hold him
duwn~t~ The testimony appearing at '"f. 548 is a
c la ri fie a tion of this.

Randel admits that he knew of only one
previous occasion where a ~'point manu had
been used in an instance of sodomy+

T. 356: Robert L. Dripps testifies as to Bowne~s
borrowing a knife and wrapping the handle.

T. 362-363: Dripps tells of Bowne's taking bloody
clothing off and washing himself+
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T.

364~

A very serious admission 1f Bovlllf ·'3. i.~ ""'eferred to by Dripps wherein - .owne says he had
a scissor lock on the Po lock ""l v~ erner] .

T. 366: Dripps quotes Bo'\vne as saying that Verner~s head hd.d almost been cut off.

:-: T. 372: Dripps again quotes Bowne as follows:
! -~
'"Well~ as I walked out Rivenburgh \Vas saying
that the way his head wast it v.ras sure hard to
eutj he had to sa"\V 7 and Bo\Vlle said~ 'when I had
that headlock un him he stabbed me with the
knife~/' The court's attention is next called to
lines 24 through 29 of this same page dealing
with Bownet~ sticking his hand into the deceased~s mouth .
T. 379-380: There appears here a clarification of
previous statements as to Bowne's having a
headlock or scissors lock on the deceased~
T~

552: Rivenburgh testifies that after stabbing
Verner, he called for assistance in finding his
lrnife and that there was much scuffling and
bumping on the floor as they attempted to find
it.

T~

578: Rivenburgh testifies he got Bowne to put
on different clothing than he normally wore.

Tr 616: Rivenburgh testifies that during the struggle- while Verner was still alive} Bo\Vlle was

physically present.
T. 651: Rivenburgh testifies he does not know
v..•hat llowne and Garcia were doing i£ anything,
to Verner because he \va~ not paying any attention.
7

T. 691: Bo\vne testifies about Rivenburgh~s statement about cutting off Verner's head~
1.,. 704: Bo"Wlle testifies that in looking for Rivenburgh~s knife, he had contact with someone.
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!. .

1\ 5709: 1.: )Wne admits that in a discussion at the
prison ... ~r ~ . had said that he had a headlock or
scissor toe 1<: on V ernerts head with his legs.
T. 736: Bowne admits having a knife in his hand in
the attic~
.-,

T. 744: Bowne admits throwing knives in the
changing -clothes and trying to stop his leg
bleeding~
"-.

~ink,
.J..

"f1m

T. 763: Bowne does not know ·~f he felt Verner at
all and admits feeling blood.
TL 772: Bowne is confused
hollering or moaning.

a~

to whether he hear .. ~.

T. 781: Bowne admits having made a statement
that he had expected there to be about 150 cuts
in v·erner's body~

T. 807: Bowne admits that the previous day on
direct examination he said that he previously
made the statement that he had VemerJs head
in a scissor lock. See also T. 860-862.
T. 815-818: ~dr~ Banks quotes from an interrogation
made previously which is set out in part:
'~"\Vith the indulgence of the Court and counsel~
I will start over.

MR. BANKS: I think there is only one answer you
could give me that I couldn!t tell you on this thing~
and it puzzles me.
MR. BOWKJ£: \Vha t is that?

MR. BANKS: That is the takjng off of the clothes.

MR. BO\VNE: You don't know

that~

do you?

i\.1R. FERRIS ANDR"CS: They vlere taken off voluntarily. If you are going to cut somebody's head
off~ I can :rt see this punki ng act coming in.
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MR. BOWNE: All right. I will tell you something.
Did you figure maybe that's just a way to get him
up there?)

QL

Did you make that statement?

A.

If it is there"' I guess I did+

***
~MR.

B . -\.KKS:
.
'Ve thought this out right from the
start. In reflection we can look back and analyze
it pretty well. That is the thing that confuses-with
his pants off so neat:r and his shirt not tornt so he
had to take them off voluntarily; the blanket in the
attic and everything elBe. We couldntt understand
it was going to be a quick job. We figured he was
enticed up there for that specific purpose, but with
the damn blanket rolled up that way~ and -with him
on his back.

WARNER BOWNE: It wa~ supposed to be a quick
job. He said, ''As soon as I get up there I am going
to kill him.'~
1\~R.

BANKS: Mack said

that~

MR. BOW:\l"E: Yes:P but he kept stalling and stalling
and stalling~ He had the knife out there all the
time+ I seen the knife~
FERRIS ANDRUS: How did he get started on
him?
WARNER BOWNE: Just ''Bangn, that~s it. That
guy let out a holler, and boy, was he kicking and
jumping all over. It sounded like a train driving
through up there.
W. L. ROBINSON: \r\There did he hit him first?
1\.iR. BOWNE: I guess he hit him in the back. He
was on the floor.
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FERRIS ANDRUS: But he got him down ready
for the punking and that is when he hlt him?
MR~ BOWNE: Yes~ that is how the deal was~ yes.
But "\Vhy didn't the guy start fighting sooner~~

Q. Did you make those answers to those questions?

A+

Yes~

Q. I will ask you if the following questions were
asked and if you made the following answers:
MR. BANKS: Well~ I will tell you~ when we first
started working with Billie~ we felt Billie was in on
it) \ve really did.
W . -\H.J\
.
. . ER BOWNE: Boy, you were really wrong
that time too~ because Billie \Vas pretty near the
only one that went against him~
W+ L. ROBINSON: We soon realized that.
WARNER BO"\VNE: He saidf "'"1vlack~ you are makjng a mistake. You can't do that." He said, "''if you
kill one stool pigeon'' he said '~there are 49 0 mote
of them in here'~ and he said '~you can~t get them
all, .so you might as well leave them alonen. He
says, '~it is senselessB. He said ~'I am not going to
tell you what to do, but I am telling you you should
not do it~ there is no sense to it. I am not going to
help you do iL ~~

Q. Did you make those ansvlers to those questions?
A.

l.{es.

1
'

T. 838: Bowne testifies he does not know what his
intent was \vhen he opened his knife and started toward Verner and Rivenburgh.
T. 850: There is much testimony about a possible
alibi and about contradictory statements made
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by Bowne as to Rivenburgh. Randel throughout
his portion of the transcript, beginning at this
page~ tells Eov.r~ne to blame it all on Rivenburgh.
T. 858: Bowne admits that Randel did not cause
him to make statements about having a scissors
lock around Verner~s head.

T. 866: Bowne suddenly remembers a portion of a
conversation which he had not remembered previously invol\-"ing preparations for the commission of an act of sodomy .

T+ 875: Bo"\Vlle admits that he does not know
whether there is any purpose for a point man
or lookout man in the attic during the perpetration of an act of sodomy.
T. 882: Bowne changes his story as to \vhether or
not he \Vas able to see the participants in the
struggle leading to Verner' bl death~
In light of the above evidence~ it is inconceivable that
the court could have dismissed the infonnation as to
Bowne for insufficient evidence.
POII\T VII
(Bo"WIJ.e}
rrHr~

TRIAL COUTIT DID NOrr ERR IN
GlVI);JG INSTRUCTION 1\:0r 15.

1\:o error was committed by the court in giving Instruction Nor 15. As far as pertinent~ the instruction reads
as follows:

.;'You are instructed that all persons concerned
in the commission of a crime~ whether they directly
commit the act constituting the offenset or aid and
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abet in its commission) are principals in any crime
so committed.***''
Bowne says the jury could have construed the terms
~'a crime~' and .c'Any crime'' so as to refer to the act of
sodomy. ThisJ of course, is untenable.

In the first place the only reasonable interpretation
of the court ~s instruction is that it applies to the crime
charged and to whlch the jury was directing its sole attention . Neither defendant was ever charged with the crime
of sodomy. As a matter of fact, it was introduced into the
case only by Bowne himself as a matter of defense.
It would appear that Bo"Wne is dealing in semantics,
intending to hang hls case on single words and phrases as
against the entire instruction and, in fact~ as against all
the instructions taken as a whole. In Bridges v4 U . S., 199
Fed .2d 811 ~ the court said:
4

~ *

**Instructions given in a criminal prosecution
may not be taken apart and a phrase here and a
clause, or even a sentence or paragraph, there used
to find error. :t ~
In People v.
stated:

Marsh~

(Ill.), 85 N.E.2d 715, the court

'~***Accuracy

in the use of language in an instruction containing a correct proposition of law
would~ of course·:t be desirable, but it is not ulways
obtainable+ For that reason we announced the role
that it is s uffic ien t if the series of instruc lions, considered as a whole, fully and fairly announce the
law applicable to the theories of the People and of
the defendant, respectively. People v. De Rosa, 378
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Ill. 557J 39 N.E.2d 1;People v. HichetteJ 324 IlL 170

7

155 N.E. 39. 17

(Okla.), 208 Pr2d 185~ it was held
that even where it appeared that the instruction complained of was .;'most poorly worded/~ but not misleading
in light of all the instructions, it did not constitute reversible error+
In Taylor v .

State~

In State V~ Zeimer~ --- u+ ----' 347 P.2d 1111. decided
January 5t 1960, the court treated a sintilar question where 7
in an habitual criminal matter, the instructions referred
to the charge as an '~offense;r'H to the question of defendant's ~ (guilt, and to the burden of proof necessary to
\._

1

J

u

conviction/' There the court said:
''While defendant is semantically correct, he
is legally without reversible error because the instructions are not prejudicial. The jury was instructed upon the meaning of habitual criminal
and upon the required elements and burden of
proof."

Furthennoret it is clearly the law in Utah that all
instructions are to be considered together and construed
as a whole~ State v. Evans, 74 U. 389~ 279 P. 950~ State v.
HendrickB~ 123 U~ 267~ 258 P.2d 452. The jury in the instant
case knew this was so by virtue of Instruction No. 31
whjch states as follows:
"These instructions are to be considered altogether as a whole, and not as if each instruction
were a complete statement of the law by itself~ . !J...nd
.
even though a rule, direction or thought is stated
in different ways and repeated in more than one
instruction you should not give it undue emphasis
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and ignore others. But you should consider all of
the instructions as a whole and apply them all to
the evidence in the light of all of the instructions~ t'
Considering all the instructions together, as we must
do, any possible error is corrected by Instruction ='To. 6:
'~There

is some evidence in this case of the
commission of other crimes. There is no crime
charged, however, in this case except Murder. Testimony of any crime not charged is not evidence
that either of the defendants is guilty of Murder.
,;~If

another crime is connected with the alleged
murdert you may consider said other crime as you
would any other act relating to the alleged circumstances connected with the alleged murdeT.']

Bowne claims the jurors were biased and prejudiced
against him for the reason that sodomyf "~the crime against
nature,'t for which he claimed to have been a lookout~ is
capable of engendering deep-seated prejudices against anyone connected with it~ and says it would be difficult for
the jurors to appreciate the fact that no one was being
prosecuted for per"V"ersion~ Instruction No~ 7 would tend
to eliminate this objection in stating:
~'Prejudice,

passion and sy1nputhetic fee1ingf;
have rio place whatsoever in your deliberations.
You should disregard all bias, prejudice, and other
extraneous. influence~. * * *''
Of course, it is true that in this jurisdiction where no
request is made, no error can be assumed to have occurred
when an appropriate instruction is not given.
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Even if error occurred, it was fully cured by all the
instructions taken as a whole and there was no prejudicial

error.
POINT VIII
(Eo\VIle)

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
GIVING INSTRUCTION KO. 26.

I~

There is no merit whatsoever in Bowne's Point V.
Only the most strained construction possible of Instruction
No. 26 could lead to the misconception claimed to have
resulted from it. No reasonable person could be misledr
Bowne~s claim is too farfetched to warrant serious
consideration.
In the course of the trial~ the judge admonished the
jury that certain evidence as to one defendant was not to
be applied to the other~ The jury was well trained by the
end of the trial..
Furthermore, Instruction No+ 11 should cure any defect CI'e'"d ted by Instruction )Io. 26. Whenever counsel requested the court to admonish the jury~ it did so; and if
the parties failed to request proper admonitions or an
instruction to cure any supposed defect it is too late now
to complain~
Since admissions are nothing other than evidencet
and stipulations are equivalent to evidence adduced by
examination, the admonitions given by the court take
<~are of the rna tter.
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POINT IX
(Bowne)

THE TRI.c\L C01JRT DID NOT ERR Il\r REFUSING TO GIVE BO\V::-JE'S I~STR.CCTION
)10. 13.
Bowne was fully and carefully protected by all of the
instructions given in the case considered as a whole. This
is all he could ask~ See reasoning at respondentts Point
VII (Bowne).
The attention of the court is called particularly to Instructions )J"os. 2~ 6, 15, 16 and 21~ all of which considered
together clearly cover Bowne's defense. It is~ of course,
not necessary that his defense be stated in his own words
if the applicable law is given the jury by the court. State
v. Rosenberg~ 84 U. 402, 35 P.2d 1004. State v. Cox~ 106 U.
253~ 147 P.2d 858. These words of Instruction No. 21 are
particularly applicable:
''You are instructed that in the event you find

that the State has proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that a defendant intended to and did in fact
commit the crime charged or the included offense·,
but that the State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the other defendant ever did
intend to paricipate in the killing_, or if you find
that the State has failed to prove that the said
other defendant committed the crin1e charged, or
has failed to prove he committed the included offense, you are then instructed to find said other
defendant not guilty~ * * *n
7

error occurred here and certainly defendant suffered no prejudice.
)I o
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POINT X
(Bown~)

Generally speaking, the matter of whether or not a
new trial should have been granted is for the trial court
to determine and its holding will not be interfered with
on appeal by the Supreme Court~ See the following cases:
State v . Montgomery~ 37 U~ 515, 109 P. 815; State v. Mellor~
73 U. 104r 272 P. 635; State v . Cooper~ 114 U. 531, 201 P.2d
764.
Bowne assigns six reasons why the judge should have
granted him a new trial. Respondent will treat them in
the order set forth. (Bowne's brief~ page 37.)
1. Bowne says a new trial should have been granted
because of prejudice developed during the trial. This was

discussed at Point II~ page 16J of his brief. The state~s
ans,ver is contained in Point IV (Bowne) of this brief.
2~

Bowne complains because the jury was separated
during its deliberations in that the bailiff took several
jurors at a time downstairB on an elevator to go to the
restrooms.
There is no evidence whatsoever that the jurors
talked with anybody except each other on this excursion
and the fact that the elevator would not accommodate a
dozen jurors and a bailiff without creating a dangerous
hazard made it imperative that if they were to avail themselves of this means of transportation, and the des]red
relief, they would have to be divided into two sections.
This subject was considered in the case of State v.
Jarrett, 112 U. 335~ 187 P . 2d 547 decided in 1947. There
1
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it was held that an interpretation preventing jurors from

separation for purposes of necessity would be an unreasonable -construction of the statute. The court said:
~~* * *The right of a defendant to have a jury 8ecluded from outside influences while deliberating
should be jealously guarded. However, this right
must not be founded on an unreasonable and an
unwarranted eonstruction of a statute. The statute
must be construed in regard to the correlative
rights of the defendant and the jurors. ''

3 . Bowne is concerned because early in the morning
the bailiff informed the court that the jury was still deadlocked. At that time a juror asked for an additional fifteen
minutes defiberation before leaving for the hoteL The extension was granted. The jurors:P ten minutes later~ came
in with a verdict of guilty~ Bovm.e urges that the verdict
was reached by means other than a fair expression of
opinion by all the jurors. This allegation is without proof
and is based on a most flimsy premise. The circumstances
do not even suggest the conclusion urged.
In the case of State v. Moore, 111 U. 458, 183 P.2d 973~
the court said:
~~.

* • Courts examine verdicts objectiveJy in the

light of competency~ relevancy, and materiality of
the evidence , sufficienc~r
... of th-e cYidence.. and factors 1-vhich might tend to create prejudice or to mislead a jury~ In reviewing records on appeal, V•/e
assume~ unless the contrary be sho'vn~ that qualified jurors have served~ and that the verdict returned \vas in consonance with the oath which
they, as jurors, took. 'rhe motion for new trial on
the alleged ground of misconduct of the jury was
properly denied.~'
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In regard to thls and the preceding point~ the court said
in Commonwealth v. Lombardi~ (Penn~)~ 70 A. 122:
''$$."A trial really fair and proper should not be
set aside for the mere suspicion or appearance of
irregularities shown to have done no actual injury .tt
If there was error~ it was not prejudiciaL

4 . Bowne says the court erred in allowing Jesse Garcia
to take the witness standr It is true that Garcia was involved in the events leading to the instant prosecution and
that he was scheduled to be tried at the conclusion of this
trial. Nor d0€s the state quarrel as to Garcia's absolute
right not to testify. See Section 77~1-10, U.C.A. 1953.
It is, however, the right of the defendant alone~ and
not of counsel who happens to be representing another
defendant in a case involving the same facts. The Rivenburgh-Bowne case was an entirely different matter from
the Garcia case.
The district attorney sincerely desired the testimony
of Garcia and had it been given, the state's case probably
v.rould have been aided materially. Respondent believes
there \vas no misconduct whatsoever on the part of Mr .
Banks. Ho,vever, mere misconduct of counsel is not
grounds for reversal unless prejudicial enough to deprive
a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Hoffa, (Iowa)~ 71 N . W.
235. Mr. Banks' actions did not truly constitute~ as suggested~ a grandstand play for the jury with the effect of
prejudicing the rights of Bowne. An indication of this is
the statement of 11r. Banks at T. 503:
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~~Jesse

Garcia at one time told me he wanted
to take the stand, your Honor.n
It is extremely difficult to see how Bowne could have
been damaged. The only statements made about Garcia
whatsoever in the hearing of the jury are set out in full
as follows:
''MR. BANKS: We will call .Jesse

Garcia.~t

MR. HANSEr\: At this time I have substantial
law to argue. Would you like it within or without
the presence of the jury?
THE COURT: We "\vill excuse the

jury~~'

(Proceedings held outside the presence of the jury.) After
the conference:
~"THE

COURT: Call the jury.
(Jury returned to courtroom and resumed their
seats.)

THE COURT: Members of the jury the State called
as its next witness Jesse Garcia~ 1·fr~ Garcia stands
charged \~ll t h First Degree Nlurder ~ and the case
has not yet been tried~ It is scheduled for trial, and
he refused to testify on the grounds his testimony
may incriminate him.

The eourt did not insist that he testify.
i\-IR_ HAl\1 SEN: \Vould you further admonish the
juryt your Honorf that I so advised him, in the
capacity of his lawyer for the trial that is to follow,
and not in the capacity of ~·1r. Bo,vne~s la\vyer in
this trial.

THE CO"CRT: Mr. Hansen states that he advised
him, as his lawy·er, not to testify+ Is that sufficient?
:.rlR. HANS"F~l\T~ AB Jesse Garciats lawyer~ your

Honor.
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THE COURT: Your next witnesst for the State.

There is a constitutional right a man does not
have to testify where it will incriminate him.
MR~

BANKS: Counsel has indicated they would
stipulate that Jesse Garcia is charged with Murder
in the First Degree and that hls trial is set to follow this triaL
TilE COURT: Will you so stipulate, 1\IJr. Hansen?

MR. HANSEN: Yes, your Honor.
MR. BANKS: Will you so stipulate, Mr. Huntsman?
:rtfR~

HUNTSMAN:

\~esJ

your Honor . ~'

Garcia's actual refusal to testify was made in chambers and out of the presence of the jury~ The court committed no error.
Bowne says that a new trial should have been granted because of the unusual order of the case . The problem
is complicated by the presence of two defendants whose
defenses, ~:hile in no way antagonistic, were somewhat
different. The court had wide discretion in the matterl
however, 23 C.J.S. 1045. The judge was careful to give it
the most orderly course possible,. to adduce all the relevant
facts, and to secure fair play for all concerned. There was
no error here.
5~

6. Bowne believes a new trial should have been ordered for the reason that the state failed to show a motive
for Bowne's participatioll in the crime. He relies on People
v. Tom Woo~ (Calif.>~ 184 P. 389. Respondent fails to
see, however~ how this case can give Bowne much comfort
since it clearly supports the state js position in the following

words~
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"~* * * But the presence or absence of motive is
essentia11.Y a question of fact) and~ like any other
fact, is not necessary to be provedj if the crime
can otherwise be established by sufficient competent evidence~ So, in this case, the absence of proof
of motive is a fact to be reckoned on the side of
innocence; but, if the proof of guilt is nevertheless
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence~ the appellants must stand convicted, notwithstanding no motive has been shown.~'

The California court adopted the holding of the Tom
Woo case in People v. Isby, (Calif.), 186 P.2d
cided in 1947 and quoted extensively therefrom.

405~

de-

1

In Morletti

v~

People,

(Colo~),

209

P~

796, the court

stated:

''*

* * It often happens that the motive for crime

escapes the shrewdest investigator. If the jury is
other-wise convinced beyond a reasonable doubt~
the absence of motive is no grounds for acquittaL~
1

In thls instance, Bowne's guilt was clear beyond ques~
tion and while the matter of motive was not explored in
depth by the state~ it is of no importance.
Some of the above grounds now set forth by Bowne
were not mentioned in his motion for a new trial except
possibly in the most general terms, and this is late in the
day for them to be raised .
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POINT XI
(Bowne)

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
F AILIKG TO COMPEL TH~ PROSECUTION TO
F"CRNISH T .L\PE RECORDINGS AND COPIES
OF ST A TElVI:ENTS MADE BY WITNESSES AND

DJ:GFENDANTS.

Jt is a discretionary matter with the trial judge as to
how far a defendant should be allowed to go in the examination of notes, statements and recordings made prior
to trial by the prosecution~

Herer the court~ for reasons satisfactory to itl' did not
see fit to order the prosecution to give certain '~.rire recordings to Bowne~ However~ they were available for inspection by the defense and~ in fact~ were heard by counsel
for both defendants, even though the recordings were
not used in evidence. Copies of written statements were
also provided for defendants' counsel..
Certain statements were used to impeach Bowne and
he was asked whether or not he had made the statement.s
and) in many cases~ he answered in the affinnative. If
Bowne had told the truth all the way through from
the beginning of the investigation to the end of the
trial~ his testimony would have been consistent at all times~
and possession of the statements would not have been of
any assistance to himr
The judge did not en in limiting the scope of the
production of documents in this matter~ He didt in factt
order that a great many of the instruments~ writings~
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photographs} reports, etc.~ requested by Bowne, be given
to him. If~ in fact~ there was error~ it was not prejudicial
in light of all the evidence adduced during the course of
the trial.

POINT XII
(Bowne)

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE CHARACTER AND REPUTATION OF THE
DECEASED.
It is true, of course, and there is no controversy about
it;t that the character and reputation of the deceased gen~
erally is inadmissible as being immaterial.. Bowne cites no
cases in support of his view that an exception should have
been made here.
While character evidence~ as the term is ordinarily construed~ was not allowed as to Verner~ still, much testimony was introduced to show that he was a depraved
pervert~ that he had engaged in acts of sodomy according
to both definitions of that term~ and that just the day before
he had been misused by five inmates, including two
negroes . No evi.dence was given as to any possible decent
characteristics the deceased might have possessed~ so
there was no necessity for introduction of evidence to the
contrary+ It is doubtful that any evidence of the type
Bowne desired to use could in any \vay have further damaged the character of the deceased~ or shown a greater

tendency to commit sodomy.
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CONCLUSION

Both appellantst Rivenburgh and Bowne~ were given
a fair trial~ conducted v.rith scrupulous care by an expe-rienced and capable trial judge before a fair and impartial jury~ The trial was conducted without prejudicial
error. Appellants' appeal is groundless and the conviction
of each should be affirmed~
Respectfully

subnritted~

WALTER L~ BUDGE
Attorney General

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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